CLASSICS ESSAY PASHUKANIS AND THE "JURISPRUDENCE OF TERROR" Colin Sumner
The concern of this review essay is to examine carefully the thesis propounded by Eugeny Pashukanis (1891 Pashukanis ( -1937 , the Soviet jurist, in his General Theory of Law and Marxism, that law is a distinctively bourgeois form of social regulation.' Positing the roots of the juridical form in the social relations of commodity exchange, Pashukanis saw law reaching its zenith in capitalism, where exchange was fully generalized. As an architect of the Bolshevik legal programme after 1917, he believed that law would wither away along with the disappearance of market relations and that the concept of &dquo;proletarian law&dquo; was erroneous. I shall argue that although Pashukanis's thesis is of considerable intrinsic interest theoretically and politically, it is ridden with difficulties and did in practice serve to pave the way for Stalin's &dquo;jurisprudence of terror.&dquo; As such, it stands as an important warning to radical criminologists that the Marxist critique of bourgeois law must be carefully understood. Anarchistic or nihilist revisions of that critique could have equally damaging consequences.
Whilst Pashukanis was already well-known to specialists in jurisprudence, being perhaps the most widely read Marxist theorist of law, he has been well and truly 'rediscovered' in the 1970s by neo-Marxist scholars of law and criminology. Ironically, whilst bourgeois jurisprudence continues to denigrate his work as an example of the weaknesses of Marxism, the neo-Marxists of today have revived him only to criticize him heavily. If there is one single most important reason for his resurrection, it is that he denounces the very form of law and thus poses a direct challenge to leftist political anxiety and action over the current demise of civil liberties, due process, and democracy (see Sumner, 1981 ). In the current phase of multinational, high finance, monopoly capital, the &dquo;tough&dquo; state is emerging, a state which closes its ranks and limits public freedoms. Our political instincts demand the preservation of those freedoms, and the struggles of our day frequently take legal form. The arguments of Pashukanis demand that we understand what that might mean.
The reconstruction of radical criminology in the 1970s has also engendered an interest in Pashukanis, for it has turned our attention to the Marxist theory of law. Parallel to work in the sociology, philosophy, and anthropology of law, this effort has challenged several tenets of classical Marx- ism and demanded more careful formulation of these propositions (for example, the origin of bourgeois law, and the withering away of law in socialism). This re-examination has drawn upon the re-interpretation of Warrington, 1981: 2-4) and that the answer to the second is therefore pre-given to be something to do with the intrinsically bourgeois character of law.
Pashukanis' enquiry was very definitely overlaid with the political demands of orthodox Bolshevism. It was designed to meet a purely political end, the speeding of the revolution which he saw as being in process, the revolution to end property relations entirely. 2) Why else would he make a sharp separation at the outset between the form of law and its obviously myriad and complex historical contents? To assert that form is unaffected by changes in content is to adopt an abstract a priori which ensures the impossibility of proletarian law, given that law is irrevocably flawed as a form of social regulation by its origins in commodity exchange.
Explicitly and lucidly reliant on Marx's methodological comments in the Grundrisse (Marx 1973 (Marx, 1955) and the rest of the Grundrisse (see Althusser, 1969 Given that the consequences of his position are so awful, it is important for us to discuss exactly what is wrong with it. In the following short space I shall attempt to isolate the key points.
Clearly Pashukanis, as and point out, has replaced one reductionism with another. He hangs everything on the single peg of commodity exchange. This has led critics to claim (1) that he neglected various preconditions of the modern legal form, e.g., the relations of production (all the critics), coercion and the class state Fine, 1979; On the substantive level, Marxists have often argued against Pashukanis that each mode of production has its own peculiar ideology of law and mode of legal regulation, and that the only thing such forms of law have in common is that they are rooted in the dominant modes of production and backed by the dominant classes. This view may be a crude conception of the general character of law, but Pashukanis's reason for rejecting it-an &dquo;empty platitude&dquo; applying equally to &dquo;all epochs and stages of social development&dquo; (p. 56)-seems weak. There is nothing wrong with adequate general concepts which &dquo;work&dquo; in the analysis of all modes of production. In the Grundrisse, Marx clearly argues this case in relation to the general concept of production (see Marx, 1973: 85 Fine (1979) , Picciotto (1979) and Jessop (1980) Weitzer, 1980) . It can be used purely coercively to create a labor force for capital (see Van Onselen, 1976 and Shivji, 1981) (Babb and Hazard, 1951) (Pashukanis, 1978) . 
